Guest Statute -- Who Is a Guest? by Young, John R.
NOTES AND COMMENTS 41 I
Brown v. Winnwood Amusement Co., supra; Ponticonio v. Clark,
95 Cal. App. 162, 272 Pac. 591 (1928). The divergence of these views
is indicative of the attitude of the courts in different jurisdictions. Few
courts have gone as far as did the court in the Lumsden case, yet some
of the language in Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., supra, indi-
cates that the same view exists in New York today.
The contention of the minority in the principal case finds support in
Myers v. Park Play, Inc., supra, which is the only Ohio case directly in
point. The court in that case, applied the doctrine of assumption of risk
with respect to an amusement device known as the "Dodgem," a
machine operated to some extent by the patron himself. That the doc-
trine could be applied to the use of the "Dodgem" and not to the use
of the "Bug," is entirely conceivable. In fact, a parallel situation exists.
in New Jersey where the court approved the doctrine as applicable in a
case involving a "Dodgem," Gardner v. G. Howard Mitchell, Inc.,
supra, but refused to recognize it in a case involving the "Virginia Reel,"
a device similar to the one in the principal case. Schnoor v. Palisades
Realty & Amusement Co., 112 N.J.L. 5o6, 172 Adt. 43 (1934).
Reasoning thus, it may be that the majority opinion in the principal case
can be reconciled with the Myers case.
WILLIAM L. ANDERSON
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GUEST STATUTE - WHO IS A GUEST?
The deceased was fatally injured while riding in a car owned and
operated by the defendant. He was invited to get into the car for the
sole purpose of pointing out to the driver the location of a house a short
distance away. In an action for negligence brought by the plaintiff, as
administrator of the estate of the deceased, the common pleas court
submitted to the jury the question of whether the deceased was a guest.
The court of appeals reversed the resulting judgment for the plaintiff
on the ground that it was manifestly against the weight of the evidence,
but refused to enter final judgment for the defendant. The Supreme
Court affirmed this ruling and remanded the cause for a new trial,
holding that the deceased was not a guest within the meaning of Ohio
G. C. sec 63o8-6, which reads as follows: "The owner, operator, or
person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle shall not be
liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a guest
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while being transported without payment therefor in or upon said motor
vehicle, resulting from the operation thereof, unless such injuries or death
are caused by the wilful or wanton misconduct of such operator, owner,
or person responsible for the operation of said motor vehicle." Dorn v.
Village of North Olmsted, 133 Ohio St. 375 (1938).
In accordance with the general weight of authority the Ohio courts
have interpreted the guest statute with regard to the purpose of its
origin and have refused to permit recovery for "ordinary negligence"
when the person being transported merely furnished gasoline, Ernest v.
Bellville, 53 Ohio App. IIO, 4 N.E. (2nd) 286 (1936), or contrib-
uted to a fund from which the driver received part of salary and expenses,
Casper v. Higgins, 54 Ohio App. 21 (937), in the absence of some
contractual relation between the parties. There must be substantial
consideration or compensation to avoid the application of the statute on
the basis of carriage for hire. In event of mutual interest relationship,
nothing short of definite and tangible mutual benefit will suffice. 3 0.
S. L. J. 356-358 (1937).
The justification for the decision in the principal case lies in the
fact that the ride furnished by the defendant afforded the deceased no
appreciable benefit, either in the way of transportation or entertainment.
In view of this fact it is difficult to see how he could properly be called
a guest, since that word connotes an element of hospitality or entertain-
ment which was entirely lacking here. If the deceased never possessed
the essential qualities of a guest it is unnecessary to look for a contractual
relation which would justify removing the rider from the category of
a guest.
In applying the Connecticut statute, chapter 3o8 of Public Acts of
1927, sec. 1, which provides that "no person transported by the owner
or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest without payment for such
transportation shall have a cause of action for damages against such
owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case of accident, unless
such accident shall have been intentional on the part of said owner or
operator or caused by his heedlessness or reckless disregard of the rights
of others," the New York court held as a matter of law that the plaintiff,
who rode along for the purpose of guiding the driver to a dentist's office,
was a guest on the ground that there was no evidence sufficient to
establish a contract between the parties by which the plaintiff was obli-
gated to pay for his transportation. Master v. Horowitz, 262 N.Y.
6o9, 188 N.E. 86, 85 A.L.R. 1182 (1932). But the Connecticut
statute expressly provides, as also does Ohio's, that the party be riding as
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a guest. If it is true that a guest is the recipient of some type of benefit
and that benefit is lacking in this situation, then the case is outside the
scope of the statute and the lack of a contractual relation is immaterial.
A contract involves mutuality and there can be no mutuality where all
the benefit flows toward one party.
In fact situations similar to that in the principal case, courts in Massa-
chusetts, where a guest rule has developed by judicial decision, have
reached the same conclusion as did the Ohio court. Lyttle v. Monto,
248 Mass. 340, 142 N.E. 795 (1924); Jackson v. Queen, 257 Mass.
515, 154 N.E. 78 (1926); Labatte v. Lavallee, 258 Mass. 527, 155
N.E. 433 (1927)-
Cases such as Crawford v. Foster, 1Io Cal. App. 8I, 293 Pac. 841
(1930); TVittrack v. Newcom, 277 N.W. 286 (Iowa, 1938); and
Bookhart v. Greenlease Motors, 215 Iowa 8, 244 N.W. 721, 82
A.L.R. 1359 (1932), concern parties receiving demonstration rides
provided for prospective purchasers by automobile salesmen; they can
be distinguished from the principal case in that there is some element of
mutual benefit in each.
What the result would have been had the deceased derived appre-
ciable benefit from the ride is conjectural, although, in the absence of
special circumstances, such consideration as directing the driver to the
location of a certain house would hardly be sufficient to take the rider
out of the guest category.
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